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Doubts about the reality of criminal offenders' autonomy
have sometimes played a role in the movement to
abolish, or greatly reduce the reach of, the sanction
of capital punishment.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Although the Epilogue of "Freedom and
Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound" speaks mainly
fronz the perspective of the present, it carriesfonvard some of
the historical themes addressed earlier in the article. The "Age
of Pound" in the title refers to the first three decades of this
century, the period during which Roscoe Pound, perhaps the
most prominent legal academic of the Progressive Era, produced
his most important writings on crinzinal justice in America. The
111ainsection of "Freedoni and Criminal Responsibility" traces
Pound's attempt to come to terms with elements of the scientific
positivism of his day, especially with his own acceptance of the
criiique of the concept offvee will that the new sciences
embodied. Pound remained optimistic that law and science
lvould someday be brought together without sacrifice of the
basic principles of either - savefor the "iwational"free will
~.equirementfor crinzinal responsibility. Due process, firm but
benevolent trial management by a sociologically-infomied
bench, and respect for thefttndamental human spirit (including
tlze consciousness of humanfreedom) would characterizefuture
crinzinal justice; how to reach that advanced stage of civilization
Pound leftfor his successors to work out.
Pound's optimism was not shared by all those who recognized
the problenu that the new sciences posedfor tlze criminal law.
The opening section of "Freedoni and Criminal responsibility"
examines several essays written at the turn of the century by a
little-known New York City lawyer named Gino Speranza
Writing on tlie eve of the era that Pound came to dominate,
Speranza launched a critique of the precedent-bound commonlaw generally and of the non-"scientific" criminal law in

We well know how central the
problem that Speranza addressed in
1901 remains to our law - and, more
generally, to our lives. For most of us,
whether we are always or only occasionally
conscious of it, the search for a
"pacificator" goes on. Just as the bifurcation of the legal process persists, so
also does the division within our minds
between the competing urges to explain
causally and to affix blame, in the strong
sense of criminal responsibility. From the
Progressive Era forward, the rhetoric of
the social and psychological causes of
crime have vied - in the law, in the
media, in ourselves - with the rhetoric
of, and ineradicable belief in human
heedom. This ceaseless battle is only
partly contained by the view that, though
determining factors exist, they are

particular. But his enthusiasm for scientific positivism waned as
he came to consider morefully its implicationsfor criminal
responsibility.Jurisprudence, he argued, wasfdunded on the
concept offree will and, mythic though it might be, that concept
answered to deep human aspirations which science could not and should not - displace. Speranza lookedforward to a
"Great Pacificator" who would define the terms of
rapprochement between law and science. He perhaps looked
forward also to a principled rationalization of the inevitable
bifurcation of criminal process - that is, the increasing
distance between the trial, wherein the traditional presumption
offvee will governed the ascription of criminal responsibility,
and the sentencing process, which was coniing to bear the
influence of the deterministic pranises of Progressive Era
penology. Unlike Pound, who never gave up tlze hope that the
domains of law and science would one day be unlfied, rather
thanforever remain parallel, Speranza conceded, in 1901, that
ultimately law was not a science. It was, and m w t remain, "one
of the humanities. "
"Freedonz and Criminal Responsibility" is both a study of
Pound and a lengthy commentary on the vicissitudes of
criminal justice in late nineteenth and early twentieth century
America. It relates Pound's perspective to those of several legal
academics and behavioral scientists of the mid-to-late 1920s
and it suggests that Pound's intellectual odyssey for-eshadows
our own attempts to come to t e l n v with tlie responsibility
problenz. It suggests also that the history ofcrinzinal j~lsticecan
twt befully understood in isolatlonfi-om the history of these
struggles which daily plague our conscious and subcorwio~lslives.

typically not all encompassing: that we
- and those whom we blame - have
the wherewithal to resist, even if we lack
the ability to draw the line between the
resistible and the irresistible.
As has been the case for generations
and perhaps centuries, we sometimes
reflect these uncertainties in our
tendency to soften the rigors of the
sanctions to which we subject those
whom we judge. Doubts about the reality
of criminal offenders' autonomy have
sometimes played a role in the movement
to abolish, or greatly reduce the reach of,
the sanction of capital punishment.
Those to whom it seems equally
irrational "merely" to incarcerate an
offender on the basis of the traditional
understanding of criminal responsibility
may be partly appeased by the thought
that the chief goal ol imprisonment is
rehabilitation. Punishment is then viewed

as aL least largely benign and responsive
to the deterministic aspect of human life.
This maintains the bifurcated regime of
the criminal law but bririgs a needed
peace of mind.
On the very long view, we have grown
increasingly aware of the fragility of our
own autonomy and increasingly
concerned that punishment conjoin a
good deal of care for "~veakness"\v,t11 a
substantial degree of deterrence and
decreasing attention to retribution. But
up close, the path of ideas about criminal
justice lhas hardly been linear. It has
been, rather, either subject to brief
moments of atavism or downright
cyclical. We are, as I write, at an
especially tense moment - and a lengthy
one at that: for several decades now, the
ideal of rehabilitation has been under.
significant pressure. To some extent we
have responded to the observation that

In truth, the rhetoric of determinism is now so pervasive
that we cannot fully understand the role of the jury without
recognizing that we sometimes ask that institution to
resolve an issue on which we are deeply divided, not only
between groups but also within ourselves.
the indeterminate sentence does not
work. Our calls for fixed sentences and
our critique of rehabilitation are thus
premised in part on the view that a
return to older ways is fairer to those we
hold responsible and even accords them
a greater degree of human dignity. To
some extent, too, we simply espress our
anger, and our natural fears of crime. Not
least, however, we seem increasingly
captured by the notion that we have gone
too far in the direction of absolving one
another of personal responsibility. It
seems entirely plausible that the dueprocess and equal-protection based
arguments for fixed sentences and for
guidelines that ensure that such
sentences will not vary from judge to
judge reflect a desire to strain out, to a
large degree, consideration of
background "causal" factors that "led" to
the crimes for which the fixed and fair
sentences are imposed. If so, theories of
will once again come to the fore; the
recrudescence of pre-Progressive-Era
ideas trades on an endorsement of the
dignity of the individual and attention to
personal responsibility, so that the
resulting approach to sanctions owes
nothing - apparently - to a modem
version of the theoly of incapacitation
solely in the social defense.
Within the legal world of bench, bar,
and academy, as in society at large, the
traditional and fundamentally unstable
view prevails. Nor have the values
associated with the traditional view
altered: political liberty, human dignity,
and freedom of the will remain
intertwined. Perhaps Professor Kadish
has put the matter as well and wisely
as anyone:
M L L CO ~~ O L conznzitmelzt
L ~
to denzocratic
values, to human dignity and seljdeternzination, to the valtie of the individual,
turns on the pivot of a view of man m a
responsible agent entitled to be praised 01blamed depending upon hisfree cl~oiceof
conduct. A view of nzelz "merely as alterable,
predictable, curable or manipulatable

things" is tlze fowzdation of a veql dyferent
social order indeed. Tlze ancient izotiolz of
free will may, in substn~ztialmeasure, be a
nzyth. But even a convinced determinist
slzould reject a govemnzental regime wlziclz is
fou~zded on a~zytl~i?zg
less iiz its system of
autlzolitati~ledisposition of citizens.
LWzether tlze colzcept of lnan as responsible
agent is fact or fancy is n vely dqferent
questionfrom whetlzer sve ought to insist tlzat
the goveinlnent iiz its coercive dealings ~vitlz
individuals nzust act on that prenzise.
[Sanford H. Kadish, "The Decline of
Innocence," 26 Calnblidge Law Jo~unal
273, 287 (1968) (quoting H.L.A. Hart,
P~~?zislzmetzt
and Responsibility, 182
(1968).]
If indeed we "ought to insist . . . ,"
we ought also to expect that tensions
within the law, and within ourselves as
we act out the law's imperatives, will be
with us to the end.
In the academy, to be sure, neo-realist
analyses and critiques have exploded
long-standing orthodoxy: the legal
designations of "free" and "unfree," hence
guilty or innocent under the criminal
law, have been portrayed as conclusions
determined by political, social, or
psychological circumstances, much in the
same way that findings of proximate
cause, duty, or a meeting of the minds
were portrayed by the realists threequarters of a century ago. Moreover, the
very distinction that legal scholars
typically draw between free will and
determinism has sometimes been derided
as a false dichotomy between "denatured
choices." The law, some seem to suggest,
should instead look to the role of culture
- to prevailing standards of behavior,
and to the beliefs that surround behavior,
and, especially, to the interaction of
"self' and culture - in establishing
appropriate guidelines for the attribution
of criminal responsibility. It is not always
easy to decipher the perspective on the
freedom issue that accompanies this
approach. One is tempted at times to
think that, here, yet another form of
determinism appears as one of the
innumerable forms of compatibilisin that

the mind has constructed in its
determined search for a place to stand
and to judge. However that may be, it is
important to noLe that the new academic
stances - neo-realist, critical-legal, or
postmodern - remain largely theoretical
accounts of the nature of law and of
human behavior. Their application in
practice might be evidenced at the
margins as they come to influence the
minds of some judges, lawyers, and
penologists. But given their inevitable
distance from our current politics, they
are even more foreign to society at large
than were the ideas of fin de sikcle
criminal anthropologists and interwar
realists, especially with regard to the core
issue of personal responsibility - the
assessment of criminal guilt.
For the most part, as we well know,
academic concern with the mysteries of
human free will remains just that:
academic. In our more public capacities,
if not always in our teaching and
theorizing in print, we mainly indulge
the presumption that underpins the law.
As a group, we may express more
skepticism about free will than other
elements of the legal caste, and so might,
like some of our predecessors, endorse,
inter alia, broader definitions of legal
insanity, but - perhaps out of allegiance
to the consciousness of human freedom
- when we act in the real world we are,
most of us, not so very far from society at
large. Like Pound, we leave the working
out of the most difficult problems to the
future. We play a role defined for us by
our culture and our psychology, as
generations of legal academics have
before us and as those that follow
probably will as well. This is a particularly
influential role. To be sure, it is only one
of many guideposts for our culture at
large, and, no d o u b ~politicians
,
and
religious leaders, among many others,
send signals that have grea~erimpacL

upon greater numbers, so far as the
alfirmation of human freedom is
concerned But as perceived guardians of
he rules and underlying theories of the
law, we hold a special place. If we are a
relatively small part of the legions whose
destiny it is to reinforce faith in human
freedom - political liberty as well as free
will, I ought to add - the work of our
particular cadre is nonetheless relatively
significant.
The current widespread obsession
with personal responsibility, it should be
noted, reflects a reaction not only against
this century's increasingly deterministic
rhetoric regarding the causes of criminal
behavior, but also against what are taken
to be the deterministic assumptions that
pervade the welfare state generally. These
assumptions reiate both to noncriminal
and criminal concerns, as government
initiatives affect existing concepts of just
deserts in distributive justice, regarding,
inter alia, property and contract, as well
as in retributive justice, the traditional
domain of the criminal law. Progressivism
is carried forward, but it is also under
profound attack across the spectrum of
political and social thought. In this, our
politics have produced a macrocosmic
reflection of t'ne microcosmic experience
within each of us.
But who is "us"? Society as a whole is
deeply divided between the heirs to
Progressivism and those who have now
rejected, or who never accepted, its
message for criminal justice. Disagreements
on responsibility not only track, in the
large, religious, social and other
alignments, but are also, ol course,
internal to hose and other perspectives,
including the recent movements along
racial, ethnic, and gender lines. This is
not the place for a rehearsal of the
multifaceted role of the free-willdeterminism issue in modern American
society. Nor - even if it were - am I
well suited to undertake such a taslz.
I want only to say that the issue is still
very much with us and that, with respect
to criminal justice, we are more

conflicted than ever. Conflicted to the
point that our attitudes defy generalization.
The main direction of our present
thought and behavior depends entirely
on the eye of the beholder. If we tend to
speak with greater confidence about main
directions in the past, that may well be
due to the increased perspective that a
historical view affords. Which is to say
that we know very little about the past
and too much about the present.
About the inscrutable present we
might nonetheless venture some final
commentary along the lines marked out
by our discussion of Speranza and
Pound. Speranza was an American
lawyer, but at the start of his career he
looked at American law from the outside,
with ties to, and an understanding of, the
continental tradition, and with the
sympathies of the scientist. Pound was
well inside the common law tradition,
albeit - early on - among its more
progressive spirits and trenchant critics.
Pound's brand of Progressivism propelled
him to the forefront of the academy, but
it also set limits to his worldview and to
his understanding of the relationship of
law to behavioral science. It engendered a
certain confidence and even complacency
as it focused his gaze on overall social
functionalism rather than on specific
human motivations. I have illustrated
that tendency in Pound partly in terms of
the evolution in his understanding of the
role of the jury. In 1909 he saw ad hoc
jury lawfinding as at least in part a
useful and progressive antidote to the
rigidity and old-fashionedness of the law;
by 1920, he mainly saw it not only as
anachronistic, but also as dysfunctional
in a society that had, across the
Progressive years, indulged in the
rhetoric of rational decision-making and
institutional coordination.
From our own perspective, the
opti~nismof the Progressive Era and of
Pound's majestic account seems a mite
naive. And the irreducible problem of
human freedom thus looms all the larger.
The story of the post-1930 period - as
yet untold - has an ending with which

we are familiar. O n the most fundamental
issue, that of human accountability, we
have made little progress. This is
reflected as much as anywhere in our
own thinking about the jury, which is, to
be sure, more complex than was Pound's.
We are still to great extent historybound, although for us history includes
the rights revolution of the postWorld-War-I1 era and the dramatic
developments in participation on juries
of women, and blacks, and of many
ethnic groups that formerly were not
represented. But our perspective on the
jury is also characterized by our
awareness of the impact, subconscious or
otherwise, of some of the newest forms of
"science" on those who seive. As a result,
our instincts about what jurors may
appropriately take into account reveal
conflict about long-settled, formal
divisions of power. In tmth, the rhetoric
of determinism is now so pervasive that
we cannot fully understand the role of
the jury without recognizing that we
sometimes ask that institution to resolve
an issue on which we are deeply divided,
not only between groups but also within
ourselves. We alternately condone or
condemn a particular jury that at least
seems to have applied some notion of
mitigated responsibility to which the law
does not formally p i e recognition.
Sometimes we recognize how
contradictory we are in this regard;
sometimes we do not.
In thinking about the relationship
between the criminal trial juiy and the
duality of our responses to those whose
actions displease us - our tendencies to
blame or to explain away -we ought to
recall that the jury is both constrained by
legal rules and a plaything of social
forces. That relationship has, therefore,
taken a variety of forms: At times the jury
has been relatively resistant to expression
of doubts about human freedom; at
others it has allowed their expression
fairly freely. Even when jurors or
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members of society at large have
expressed such doubts, they have usually
done so in the spirit of recognizing in a
particular case an exception to what they
perceive in general as valid rules
regarding responsibility. Thus, when the
jury has gone outside the rule of law, it
has often fortified the presumption of
human freedom by providing a release
point where otherwise that presumption
might have been called into doubt. In
this fashion, the jury has at times
functioned as a legitimator at the trial
stage, just as some substantive doctrines
have done against the background of
the unprovable premise that underlies
our traditional theory of criminal
responsibility. That has not necessarily
been anyone's intention, any more than
we are necessarily selfconscious about the
manner in which we - in our private
lives - shore up our own blaming
instinct by giving way in particular
instances where insistence upon blame
might lead us to suspect, rightly or
wrongly, that there is always something
rationally indefensible about that
insistence
The legal constraints within which
juries operate can, of course, be
understood as reflections of the interests
of authorities in husbanding the power to
withhold or to grant release from the
rules of criminal responsibility on their
own terms. But that does not do full
justice to the long history of the jury's
power to find, or to nullify, the law. The
English bench has at times encouraged
juries to play that very role, at times
sought to set distinct but far from total
limits on that practice, and at times
attempted to eliminate it altogether. On
the American side, the story has been and remains - equally complex. From
yet another perspective, limitations upon
the jury have often reflected attention to
the rule ol law as a general matter and
have been only incidentally related to,
though they may have had significant
impact upon, the tensions regarding
responsibility that I have been discussing.

Finally, jury nullification in cases
involving the issue of human autonomy
bears an important relationship to jury
nullification in so-called political cases.
In the latter, the jury is often in the
position of affirming human freedom:
even where the jury is mainly registering
opposition to a particular law, the
defendant who is thereby treated
mercifully is sometimes thought to have
challenged that law on the basis of deep
moral beliefs, of his or her own free will.
This is the tradition of jury latitude that
was long the backbone of the jury lawfinding doctrine and it remains central to
the modem jury nullification debate.
Social and legal recognition of the
legitimacy of this form of jury behavioror even mere toleration of its occasional
manifestation - cannot help but fortify
jury nullification where the jury
disaffirms human freedom: most
notoriously, in some cases where the
defendant has raised a legal insanity
defense, but also, more generally, in
routine criminal cases, where juries have
sometimes responded intuitively to what
might be termed commonplace social
constraints upon freedom of thought and
action. There has never been, in the
Anglo-American tradition, an effective
separation between arguments for jurybased law-finding in these very different
kinds of cases. The age old practice of
freedom-disaffirmance, in its most
general forms, has traded on the
longstanding tradition of freedomaffirmance in cases raising the question of
political liberty, and vice versa.
I have, on another occasion, alluded to
an important aspect of the relationship
among the English criminal trial jury, law
reform, and the problem of responsibility
that we do well to keep in mind as we
attempt to situate Pound in relation to
our own time and place. The reform of
sanctions in the early Victorian era may
have been undertaken in part as a
reaction to the tendency of jurors to give
weight to the social conditions that
produced crime as they searched for
reasons to nullify the capital sanction for
what they viewed as less than the most

heinous of offenses. Here, the interests of
political and legal authorities in
maintaining the integrity of the orthodox
theory of responsibility mixed with their
interests in deterrence and in simple
humanitarianism. The reform of
sanctions then combined with ongoing
property qualifications for jury service
and with the development of a culture of
deference to the bench to produce over
time a self-restrained English criminal
trial jury Some early-twentieth century
American critics of the criminal trial jury,
including Pound, drew lessons from the
English experience and sought to make
over the American trial in the image of its
English counterpart. But not all such
critics shared the same agenda. Among
the common lawyers, Pound was, if not
unique, something of an odd man out.
Pound wrote about the sources of the
extensive powers of the American jury at
some length. For the most part, he
situated the jury within the history of
political liberty. With respect to human
autonomy, he stressed, as we have seen,
jury-based acceptance of the frontier
urges of vindication of honor-the
assertion of individual liberty-rather
than jury-based recognition of the social
and psychological constraints upon
human freedom. Pound favored a more
limited role for the jury, but not in order
to shore up the orthodox common-law
theory of criminal responsibility. Rather,
he deemed jury-based law-finding
dysfunctional precisely because, whether
it was progressive or retrogressive, it was
relative to a theory of responsibility that
he thought irrational. Pound sought to
husband for the bench the powers that
the positivists sought to reserve for
scientific experts, and like the positivists,
he did so in the name of substituting a
new theory of responsibility for the
orthodox free-will-based theory of
common law criminal jurisprudence.

Pound's hopes for a true melding of
law, science, and morals came to naught;
even he could not squarely confront the
implications of the sermon he preached.
The positivist program relative to a new
applied theory of criminal responsibility
has largely collapsed. Orthodoxy has
prevailed, albeit amidst the heightened
tensions produced by the rhetoric
regarding the causes of criminal behavior
that the positivists boldly set in motion
and the Progressives furthered in their
own more tentative fashion. This is the
situation in which modem American
society, including the institution of the
criminal trial jury, now finds itself.
We are confronted daily with evidence
that seems to confirm Pound's insistence
upon a particular form of American
exceptionalism (our "frontier attitude")
regarding the intensity of our attraction
to individual rights, the frequency of our
recourse to violent self-help, and the
depths ol our suspicion of the state.
What Pound deemed an unhealthy, "held
over" attachment to will theory probably
strikes some as Americans' ongoing
- embrace of the deepest truth, others as
recourse to a useful belief (conducive
both to the preservation of political
liberty and the cultivation of a sense of
personal well-being), and still others as
too great a rejection of what - like it or
not - we already know about the nature
of ourselves. Among even these last there
may be some who nonetheless believe
that an appropriate balance between the
"religion" of free will and the "science" of
determinism is struck in the rituals by
which we now live. And among these
rituals are the practical and symbolic
aspects of jury-based determination of
guilt - in some cases, of punishmentin accordance neither with pure legal
abstraction nor with supposed scientific
precept, but, as we are wont to say, with
the "common sense" and the "conscience"
of the community.

Perhaps as testimony to this
perspective, the phenomenon of
bifurcation of the criminal process has
developed increasing prominence. In
capital cases, to take a leading, though
admittedly exotic, example, the
sentencing stage in most states is left in
the hands of the jury, so that the same
persons first assess guilt on the basis of
the limiting terms of the law of evidence
and then, if they convict of capital
murder, sometimes reassess it (de facto)
in the context of affixing punishment in
light of information that, had it been
before them at the trial stage, might have
led them to a different result. The ad hoc
aspect of lay decisionmaking has been
harnessed to the process at sentencing the potentially more "scientific" stage a turn of events that would have appalled
Pound even as it might have pleased the
Speranza of 1901. Decisions must not
only be made, they must also be lived
with. So, too, must incoherence be lived
with, and - evidently - its lessons

allowed to temper our judgment as we,
case by case, see fit. Not only with
respect to the marketplace wherein
Professor Dawson traced the history of
economic duress, but in the domain of
criminal justice administration as well.
Perhaps there more than anywhere.
For it is one thing to observe academically
that we can't prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was a free
agent; it is another actually to have to
pass judgment upon persons who society
has agreed must be held responsible indeed, who are said to have a right both
with respect to human dignity and as
against overweening political authority to
be conceived of as personally responsible.
The resulting tension can be very great,
and the ritual of judgment is sometimes
no less than an act of faith. One feels a
certain truth - shall we say, a certain
consolation? - in the observation that,
after all (let Speranza's words be my last):
"Law is one of the Humanities."
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